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Abstract
We develop a stylized dynamic model of highway policing in which a non-racist police oﬃcer is
given incentives to arrest criminals, but faces a per stop cost of stop which increases when the racial
mix of the persons he stops diﬀers from the racial mix of the population. We deﬁne the fair jail
rate to be when the racial composition of the jail population is identical to the racial composition
of the criminal population. We study the long-term racial composition of the jail population when
the policeman decides whom to stop based only on his last period successes in arresting criminals.
The study of this “imperfect recall” case shows, consistent with empirical ﬁndings, that the long
term racial jail rate is always greater than the fair one and the gap increases when incentives are
made more powerful. We then study this rate when policemen are provided with data concerning
conviction rates for each race, similar to the data which is now being collected in many states. In
this case, we ﬁnd that although the long term rate is still greater than the fair rate, it is smaller than
that obtained in the imperfect recall case. We discuss the desirability of such data collection and
dissemination of information among police oﬃcers.
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earlier versions of this paper and to Jeremy Greenwood, Nicola Persico, and Oscar Volij for beneﬁcial feedback. As usual,
all remaining errors are our own.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Racial proﬁling among the police force has been a topic of debate for several years now. It ﬁrst became
a national issue in the media when it was suspected that highway troopers stopping cars on the I-80
corridor made heavy use of racial proﬁling. In April of 1999, it was conﬁrmed by New Jersey Attorney
General Peter Verniero that state troopers routinely used the race of drivers on the New Jersey Turnpike
to decide whom to stop and search. Since then, it has become generally accepted that at least some
racial proﬁling is practiced by police.
T h et w os i d e so ft h ei s s u eo fr a c i a lp r o ﬁling can be brieﬂy stated as follows. Opponents of racial
proﬁling ﬁnd that it is unreasonable to simply use race, without any additional indication of criminal
behavior, as probable cause. Proponents argue that if members of one race are statistically more likely to
be involved in a certain crime, racial proﬁling has to be an important tool when ﬁghting crime. Clearly,
both of these points have merit. If there is a type of crime exclusively committed by white Americans,
there is little point in forcing police to consider people of all ethnicities as potential criminals. On the
other hand, if all ethnicities engage in the crime, common perceptions of fairness would imply that all
criminals should be at risk for being caught, even if one of the ethnic groups has a higher crime rate.
Complicating matters further is the fact that unless all racial groups are investigated, it is not possible
to be certain that a speciﬁc type of crime is committed exclusively by one racial group. For example, the
police could, by only giving Hispanics breathanalyzer tests, create the impression that only Hispanics
drive drunk.
There is no clear picture of the extent to which racial proﬁling is employed. While it is deﬁnitely true
that blacks and Hispanics are disproportionately represented in the country’s jails and prisons, this may
be due to factors other than racial proﬁling.1 These other factors include the theoretical possibility that
blacks and Hispanics may actually engage in more criminal activity, as well as the reasonable notion
that lower income people typically cannot aﬀord good legal representation. These issues complicate
matters, and it is clear that before proceeding it is necessary to have a speciﬁcd e ﬁnition of what
exactly constitutes a fair justice system. In this paper, we choose to deﬁne a fair justice system as one
in which the racial distribution of the prison population is identical to the racial distribution of the
criminal population.2
1A c c o r d i n gt o1 9 9 7n u m b e r sf r o mt h eU Sc e n s u s ,t h en u m b e ro f incarcerated blacks and whites was virtually the same,
although blacks only constituted 12 percent of the total of black and white Americans.
2Katherine Kersten implies a similar deﬁnition when she argues that “... to determine whether Minnesota has “too
many” male inmates, we must compare the proportion of males in the prison population with the proportion of males
in the criminal population, not the population at large...” in her 2001 article in The Weekly Standard. Persico (2002)
2In this paper, we examine the issues of racial proﬁling in the context of “high discretion interdiction”
(Persico, 2002). One example of such a situation is highway stops. This is the area of policing in which
racial proﬁling was ﬁrst brought up, and it is in this context that the phrase ‘driving while black’ was
coined, because many African Americans felt that they were targets of stops only because of their skin
color.
In our model, we assume that police oﬃcers are not racist.3 The oﬃcers are given incentives to arrest
as many guilty people as possible, in the form of a ﬁxed payment for every criminal caught. However,
they also face a per stop cost that increases whenever the proportion of people they stop from one racial
group deviates from the proportion of this group in the whole population. Individual oﬃcers maximize
their revenue, and only based on this do they make the decision about whom to stop.4 Our goal is to
study the long run equilibrium in this setup. Speciﬁcally, we wish to compare the ethnic distribution
of the incarcerated population with the ethnic distribution of the entire criminal population.
In order for the police oﬃcers in our model to maximize revenue, they need information on the exact
crime rates in the diﬀerent ethnic populations. In reality, police oﬃcers do not have hard evidence of
exact crime rates in each racial group. Instead, when deciding whom to stop and search, they rely on
their experience, word of mouth among colleagues, and statistics on convicted criminals, to make their
judgements about who is more likely to be involved in criminal activity. This lack of precise knowledge
of actual crime rates in diﬀerent ethnic populations is a feature which we attempt to capture in our
model. In the ﬁrst version of the model, we assume that the oﬃcers use the racial distribution of inmates
in jail to estimate rates of criminality in the population, and that they make their decision about whom
to stop according to these estimates. In the second version of the model we consider a situation where
oﬃcers have access to information on past total number of stops by race, as well as conviction rates
by race, of those stopped. The reason for making this assumption is that this type of data is currently
being collected in many, but not all, states, and federal legislation under consideration would mandate
the same type of data collection. This additional information enables oﬃcers to get a precise picture
of the crime rates in each ethnic group, and this naturally aﬀects their choices about whom to stop.
employs the deﬁnitions that both groups should be investigated with the same intensity, which in our setup would lead to
af a i ro u t c o m e .G a r yS .B e c k e rp r o v i d e sas o m e w h a td i ﬀerent deﬁnition in his July, 2000 article in Business Week “... if
stops of blacks and whites uncover evidence at about the same rate, that suggests the police are using reasonable criteria
for deciding whom to stop and search.” This will never occur in our model unless crime rates are indentical, and even then
this may not be the best deﬁnition of fairness. See Chakravarty (2002) for a detailed discussion on this.
3The assumption that police oﬃcers are not racist is supported by ﬁndings in Knowles et al. (2001). They ﬁnd that
excess investigation of blacks is motivated purely on eﬃciency grounds rather than racial prejudice. Note, however, that
we are modelling what happens even if the oﬃcers are not racist.
4A study by John Lamberth shows that 98.1% of all cars on a stretch of the New Jersey Turnpike are exceeding the
speed limits. (See New Jersey v. Soto, 1996) This makes it reasonable to assume that police can stop any car passing by.
3Through these two diﬀerent information assumptions, we are able to examine the long-run eﬀects of the
belief formation on the incarceration rates of diﬀerent ethnic groups.
In the framework described above, we show that providing incentives to arrest criminals always gives
rise to excess incarceration of the ethnic group which is more criminal, compared to their share of the
criminal population. In other words, if 11% of whites commit crimes, but only 10% of blacks do, in the
long run, whites will comprise more than 11/21 of the incarcerated population. In that sense, jail rates
will be “unfair”, in that they do not represent the true rate of criminality among a race. The long-run
result is in part due to a self-reinforcing ﬂaw in the way oﬃcers estimate crime rates. The mechanism
is as follows: The oﬃcers are given incentives to arrest criminals. Based on their estimate of the racial
criminality, they decide how many people to arrest within a community. The power of incentives may
then lead them to arrest more people within a given racial community. As a result, members of this
community may be over-represented in jail, which in turn leads to inﬂated estimates of the crime rate
among blacks in the next period.5
We ﬁnd that improved information lessens the problem of over-incarceration, but does not com-
pletely eliminate it. This result lends credence to the suggestion made by many civil rights and anti-
discrimination groups that police oﬃcers should record the race of the people who are stopped. It is
worth noting that, for example, the ACLU does not see this data collection as a solution in itself, but
rather as a way of documenting the existence of the problem. In contrast, we argue that simply dispers-
ing better information on crime rates may diminish the magnitude of the problem.6 In other words, if
the police oﬃcers are provided with information about the stops they made and realize that for a given
race the stops did not lead to as many convictions as expected, they will reduce the number of people
stopped from that race, leading to less over-incarceration in the future. In spite of this reduction in
over-incarceration, the incentives provided to the police oﬃcer ensure that he will continue to sample
more people from the high crime group.
An interesting implication of the results we obtain is that over-incarceration of a speciﬁc ethnic group
c a no c c u r ,e v e ni fo ﬃcers are not racist in the least. This, in turn, would imply that programs intended
5In Persico (2002) the fair steady state is reached even though there is no stigma attached to non-random sampling.
T h e r ec r i m er a t e sd e c l i n ea sap o p u l a t i o ni ss a m p l e d ,e v e n t ually equalizing the crime rates across populations. This
implies that random sampling becomes optimal, and the fair steady state is achieved. Presumably, if a cost to non-random
sampling was introduced, there might not be enough excess sampling of the high-crime group to equalize crime rates across
diﬀerent groups and it might be possible to obtain results similar to those presented in this paper.
6In their 1999 report on racial proﬁling, the ACLU discusses a bill that would make it mandatory to collect data on
the race of people stopped on highways: “The idea behind the bill was that if the study conﬁrmed what people of color
have experienced for years, it would put to rest the idea that African Americans and other people of color are exaggerating
isolated anecdotes into a social problem. Congress and other bodies might then begin to take concrete steps to channel
police discretion more appropriately.”
4t oe d u c a t ep o l i c eo ﬃcers and make them ‘color-blind’ may have absolutely no eﬀect whatsoever; not
because the police oﬃcers refuse to reform, but because they are not racist in the ﬁrst place! As long
as they are provided with incentives to catch as many criminals as possible, the over-incarceration is a
result of optimizing behavior on the part of police.
While our paper shares certain aspects of belief formation and self-fulﬁlling negative discrimination
with many other papers, such as Farmer and Terrel (1996), Acemoglu (1995), Coate and Loury (1993),
and more recently, Verdier and Zenou (2001), the similarities are somewhat superﬁcial. The models in
the papers mentioned above possess the common feature that there is a principal (often an employer)
who acts upon a negative belief and takes a cost-less discriminatory action against the agent. The
principal’s action makes it optimal for the party who is discriminated against, to take such actions
as to make the principal’s “prophecy” self-fulﬁlling. In our setup, when the current generation of
police use incarceration data to decide on which race to interdict more frequently, they may perpetuate
their mistaken belief against the over-represented race, but at a cost: the cost of deviating from strictly
random sampling. The aforementioned papers do not model this cost. Two additional points of contrast
deserve mention here. First, we clearly demonstrate that long-run discrimination against a race can
be obtained even without the assumption of a priori negative beliefs. Second, because we do not
discuss issues relating to the supply of crime, we are, per force, silent on whether the race that is
discriminated against truly ends up becoming more criminal, thereby “justifying” the discrimination.7
Another important recent paper by Persico (2002) studies the question: is increased fairness on the part
of the police necessarily deleterious for eﬃciency? He ﬁnds that if both races have the same population
fraction of criminals (an equilibrium free-entry-into-crime condition in his static model) and if one group
i sp o l i c e dw i t hl e s si n t e n s i t y ,t h e nf o r c i n gt h ep o l ice to increase the intensity of interdiction on that
group could raise both fairness and eﬀectiveness of policing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up and solve the model where police
oﬃcers have limited information. In Section 3 we discuss the implication of the “End Racial Proﬁling
Act of 2001” which, among other things, would mandate data collection such that oﬃcers have full
information, and in Section 4 we conclude. Proofs are relegated to an appendix.
7Persico (2002) discusses the “general strain theory” and how unfairness in police practices may itself encourage crime
among those being unfairly treated.
52 A Model of Updating with Limited Information
Consider a situation where there are N citizens in the district of a certain police oﬃcer. On each date
t =1 ,2,...,∞, 50% of these are white and the rest are black.8 Let ci,i= b,w be the unknown, true
percentage of criminals among the black and white populations, respectively. Note that in practice these
numbers are diﬃcult to measure, because if we simply examine the arrests/convictions, those numbers
are typically inﬂuenced by the behavior of the police and may be very inaccurate.
Unless otherwise explicitly stated, we will assume throughout that cb >c w. Clearly, we could just
as easily assume that cw is larger, without results being aﬀected.9 We will discuss separately the case
where the rates are identical, as it is somewhat diﬀerent.
In addition to the assumptions above, we will assume it is known to everyone that a fraction q of
the entire population are criminals. That is, q is known, while the individual components, cb and cw
are not.10 Furthermore, we assume that cb, cw, and q are all time invariant.
Since the majority of data on racial proﬁling has been collected in the context of highway stops, this
is the situation we have in mind when creating this model. As mentioned in the introduction, almost
all cars traveling on the highway can be legally stopped because of minor or major traﬃc violations.
Typically these violations are used as cause to stop the vehicle, but after the vehicle has been stopped
it is searched for drugs and weapons or other signs of more serious oﬀenses. We model the highway stop
simply by saying that the police oﬃcer can legally stop any car, and after the car is stopped he can
determine with 100% accuracy whether the person in the car is guilty of a serious oﬀense. We assume
that if the policeman stops a guilty person, that person is always subsequently convicted and spends
the remainder of the period in jail. If a policeman stops an innocent person, that person is immediately
released and will not be stopped for the rest of the period.11 We assume that the oﬃcer will receive
ac o m p e n s a t i o no f$x f o re a c hg u i l t yp e r s o nh ec a t c h e s . T h i sa s s u m p t i o ni sap r o x yf o ra l li n c e n t i v e
rewards, such as pay increases, promotions, medals, etc. However, the policeman will receive $0 when
no one is arrested. Hence, the payments cannot be strictly negative. This assumption is a limited
liability condition.
8This assumption does not qualitatively aﬀect the results; it merely simpliﬁes both the algebra and the intuition.
9Note that here we deviate from Persico (2002), who assumes that in equilibrium cb = cw. This is the natural outcome
in his model, since he assumes that there is no cost associated with stopping only members of one race. This assumption
implies that if cb >c w, only blacks will be stopped, which, in turn, will lead to the crime rate of whites to rise. With the
assumption that it is very costly to the oﬃcer to stop only members of one race, this need not be the equilibrium outcome.
10The idea behind this assumption is that it is easier to determine the total number of crimes (= q · n =
1
2 (cb + cw)n)
and criminals than it is to determine the racial distribution of criminals.
11Note that since criminals are released at the end of the period, the percentage of criminals in the various populations
remains constant period after period.
6The policeman stops exactly n< <Npeople in each period. This number is pre-determined and
beyond his control. If the police oﬃcer expends no special eﬀort, he stops a racial mix which corresponds
to the population proportion, that is n/2 blacks and n/2 whites. At a cost, however, he can change
these proportions. Let Sb denote the proportion of the people he stops who are black. The associated
cost function is Ω(Sb)=A
¡1
4 − Sb (1 − Sb)
¢
,A> >0. This is the cost per stop of deviating from
strictly random sampling. A is the exogenous parameter which determines the per-stop cost for a given
racial mix. Note that Ω(.) obtains its minimum at Sb = 1
2, is convex, and symmetric around Sb = 1
2.12
Our reasons for assuming that the cost function obtains its minimum at 1
2 is that, in reality, random
stopping is easier for the police oﬃcer, in the sense that there is no need to establish the race of the
motorist before pulling him over, and that there is no need to wait for someone of the right ethnic
group to pass by. Another reason for this feature is that we believe it is costlier for police oﬃcers to
stop higher proportions of one race. This cost is associated with the stigma connected to accusations of
bias. For example, Mr. Dunphy of the Los Angeles Police Department discusses the data on ethnicities
collected on scantron sheets in a 2001 article in National Review and states, “If I show a pattern of
ﬁlling in too many of the wrong circles there may be dire consequences awaiting me, no matter how
benign my contacts have been.”
We assume that the policeman is willing to accept the following contract if and only if his revenue
exceeds his best outside option, which is normalized to 0 for simplicity. Therefore, “participation” in
the oﬀered contract will be obtained as long as the expected revenue is positive.
Initially, consider as a benchmark a case where cb and cw are known. The expected revenue, per
stop, of the policeman is then:




− Sb (1 − Sb)
¶
. (1)
If cb = cw, the optimal choice is clearly S∗
b = 1
2 such that the racial distribution of the incarcerated
population will correspond to the racial distribution of the population in general.




2A . This suggests that if blacks in fact
engage in more criminal activity than whites, more than 50% of the oﬃcer’s stops will be of blacks.13
Now consider the more general case where the oﬃcer does not know cb and cw.I na n yp e r i o dt,i f
12Note that the symmetry of the cost function implies that it is equally costly to discriminate against either race. If the
population consists of α whites and 1 − α blacks, the cost function should be adjusted to obtain its minimum at 1 − α.
13In order to get an interior solution ( i.e. S
∗
b ≤ 1), the set of allowable parameters values must be restricted. It is
routine to check that if A ∈ ((cb − cw)x,+∞), S
∗







4A (cb − cw)
2 > 0. Thus, participation is always insured.
7there are Jt
b blacks and Jt




































Intuitively, these are the estimates obtained by assuming that the prison population is representative.






the proportion of the jail population that is white, and it thus estimates the percentage of the criminal





w · (q · N) is therefore an estimate of the total number of white criminals. When the number is
divided by the size of the white population, N/2, it provides an estimate of the proportion of criminals
among the white population. These estimates would be unbiased estimates of cb and cw if the prison
population were the result of random stops of the population.
The questions which we are interested in answering in this limited information framework are whether
the fair steady state is ever obtained, and how the incentive payments to the oﬃcer and the information
structure aﬀect the long-run outcomes. Before moving on, it will therefore be useful to formally deﬁne
the fair steady state. This is the steady state where the racial composition of the prison population
is identical to the racial composition of the criminal population, in and out of jail. This means that
we can denote the proportion of blacks in jail at the fair steady state by F∗ = cb
cb+cw. This provides a
utopian benchmark to which we will compare the steady states of the various models in this paper.
Using aforementioned estimates of ˆ ct
b and ˆ ct














The expected number of black people jailed in the next period is then simply the number of black
























































w, this is a system of diﬀerence equations. We denote steady
states obtained as equilibria from (2) by J∗.
14Our model is a reduced form model. In a less parsemonious model, one would formulate an arrival process of criminals
such that the expected value of J
t+1
b would be cbnS
t
b. We feel that this would add complexity without adding insight.
8At time 1, we will assume that there is an existing jail population, J0
b and J0
w. The model is thus
initiated by the oﬃcer calculating his ﬁrst estimates, maximizing revenue and determining the optimal
number of blacks (and whites) to stop. It turns out that the dynamical system is history independent,
so the composition of the initial jail population does not aﬀect the jail rates at the steady states.






A [2zt − 1]
q +( cb − cw)
qx
A [2zt − 1]
,t =1 ,2,...
We are now ready to state the main result of this paper:
Proposition 1 There are two steady states in the model, J∗
L and J∗




H is locally stable.
b) At J∗
H, when x(A) increases (decreases), the proportion of blacks in the jail population increases and
the proportion of whites decreases.
c) J∗
H = F∗ if and only if x is 0 or A is ∞.
d) When x>0,J ∗
H >F∗.
Proposition 1 states that there is a single stable steady state that can be approached from arbitrary
initial conditions. Furthermore, we show that increasing incentives to oﬃcers will worsen the excess
incarceration of blacks and, similarly, increasing the cost of non-random sampling will make the excess
incarceration less severe. Finally, we show that only when there are no incentives will the fair steady
state be obtained. For all other combinations of cost and incentives, blacks will be over-represented in
the prison population. This result is driven by the fact that when blacks have higher crime rates than
whites, more criminals will be caught if more blacks are stopped. In the absence of a cost of non-random
stopping, police oﬃcers would stop only blacks. Since this is not cost-less, police oﬃcers will equalize
marginal beneﬁt to marginal cost and, therefore, stop more blacks than whites, but not solely blacks.
If it were possible to oﬀer no incentives (x =0 ), police oﬃcers would not be willing to incur the costs
of non-random sampling, hence the fair steady state would obtain. Note however, that for the oﬃcer to
participate when there are no incentives, costs (A) must be zero as well.
To illustrate the dynamic evolution of the model, we present the results from a few simulations
where we have started the model with some initial jail rates and let the jail population develop. We
let these simulations run for 30 periods, and follow the evolution of the rate of whites and blacks in
jail. In each graph we have plotted the fair rate for each race, to provide a benchmark. Graphs 1 and
2 have identical parameter values, except for the starting values of Jb and Jw. Comparing these two
9demonstrates the fact that the steady state is history independent (the fact can also be established
by looking at the expression for J∗
H provided in the appendix). Graphs 2, 3 and 4 are created using
identical parameter values, except for x, which varies, demonstrating the eﬀect of the strength of the
incentives on the steady state. Graphs 5, 6, and 7 illustrate the very special case where crime rates
for blacks and whites are exactly identical. In this situation, the model behaves somewhat diﬀerently.
Depending on the parameter values, one of two steady states is obtained: either a steady state where
only one race is stopped or the fair steady state. In the steady state where only one race is stopped,
which race gets stopped is entirely determined by initial beliefs. If incentives are strong enough, the
police oﬃcer will never sample the race he perceives to be low-crime often enough to gain evidence
against his initial beliefs. While it is interesting that the model is able to generate a situation where
initial jail rates (possibly created by a racist police force of the past) cause persistent discrimination,
we include this example mainly for the sake of completeness. In a situation where only one race is
stopped, it becomes critically important to have the supply of crime included in the model (see Persico
(2002)) and, in addition, the chances that crime rates are exactly the same seem very small given the
vast socioeconomic diﬀerences between the populations.
3E v a l u a t i n g t h e e ﬀects of the “End Racial Proﬁling Act of 2001”
As a reaction to lawsuits and complaints by various civil rights groups, legislation is being introduced
at both the state and federal level to monitor and/or curb racial proﬁling. The most recent, and by far
the most comprehensive, federal legislation to be introduced in Congress is the “End Racial Proﬁling
Act of 2001” (ERPA).15 The ERPA starts oﬀ with a long list of ﬁndings. Among these are that the
vast majority of law enforcement agents discharge their duties without bias, and that racial proﬁling is
a practice that is well documented and undesirable. The ERPA states that “No law enforcement agent
or law enforcement agency shall engage in racial proﬁling.” In addition to the prohibition of the act of
racial proﬁling, the ERPA mandates that detailed data must be collected on stops, searches, seizures,
and arrest, such that it can be determined whether racial proﬁling is taking place.
Several previous laws suggesting that data on racial proﬁling be collected have been put before
Congress, but ERPA is the ﬁrst to clearly deﬁne exactly what is understood by racial proﬁling. In
ERPA, it is written that: “The term ‘racial proﬁling’ means the practice of a law enforcement agent
relying, to any degree, on race, ethnicity, or national origin in selecting which individuals to subject to
15Introduced in the Senate as S.989 and in the House as H.R.2074.
10routine investigatory activities, or in deciding upon the scope and substance of law enforcement activity
following the initial routine investigatory activity,16 except that racial proﬁling does not include reliance
on such criteria in combination with other identifying factors when the law enforcement agent is seeking
to apprehend a speciﬁc suspect whose race, ethnicity, or national origin is part of the description of the
suspect.” This deﬁnition is substantially stronger than those typically seen in state legislation. At the
state level, using race as an indicator for criminal activity is only considered racial proﬁling if an oﬃcer
or agency relies solely on race, ethnicity, or national origin in selecting which individuals to stop.17
This obviously is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence, since it is extremely diﬃcult to verify that there was no other
cause for the stop than race, making it substantially more diﬃcult to enforce the state legislation. The
deﬁnition suggested in ERPA also rules out using knowledge that one ethnicity is much more likely
to commit a given type of crime than another ethnicity. Using this type of knowledge is often called
statistical discrimination and is deemed an important tool by law enforcement agencies. In the context
of the type of traﬃc stops which we are modelling, this very strict deﬁnition has the implication that
only random sampling is allowed. As a consequence, the legislation amounts to outlawing both racial
and statistical (based on race) discrimination, and Congress is, in fact, attempting to put into force the
fair steady state.
When attempting to determine the eﬀects of this legislation, should it be enacted, there are two
aspects we need to consider. The ﬁrst is data collection and the additional information the data provides,
and the second is the consequences of the act of racial proﬁling being outlawed. When we consider the
eﬀects of the data collection below, we will assume that this collection provides the oﬃcers themselves
with additional information and examine the long-run consequences of this additional information.
We model the prohibition of racial proﬁling as a sharp increase in the cost of deviating from random
sampling, rather than the actual enforcement of random sampling. The reason for this is that actual
random sampling is clearly impossible to enforce. But since racial proﬁling is now illegal, it seems
reasonable to assume that the police oﬃcer will have to go to great lengths to attempt to hide any
non-randomness, and that the potential cost if he is caught has suddenly become substantially higher
than before the legislation was enacted.
To examine the eﬀects of the additional information in the context of the model, we assume that the
16In the ERPA, routine investigatory activities are deﬁned in the following manner: “The term ‘routine investigatory
activities’ includes the following activities by law enforcement agents: traﬃc stops; pedestrian stops; frisks and other types
of body searches; consensual or nonconsensual searches of the persons or possessions (including vehicles) of motorists or
pedestrians; ...”
17Note that since race is the only heterogeneity among motorists in our model, the model cannot distinguish between
the two deﬁnitions in its current form.
11oﬃcers now have precise information on the race of the people they have stopped as well as the conviction
rates for each race.18 This would enable the oﬃcers to estimate crime rates in the two populations,





















wn, where the denominators are the number of people of
the given race who are stopped, and the numerator represents the number of convictions among this
group. Note that under broad sets of assumptions on the arrival process of vehicles, these are unbiased
and consistent estimators, since on average Jt
b = cbSt
bn.
Because we are interested in the long-run outcomes of the legislation, we will approximate the
consistent estimators described above by the true values, cb and cw (it also signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes the
analysis of the model). Thus, the steady state we are interested in will be the one where cb and cw are
known. From (1), we know that the per-stop revenue is deﬁned as
R(Sb)=Sb · cb · x +( 1− Sb) · cw · x − A(1 − Sb (1 − Sb)),
which results in the following ﬁrst order condition of the oﬃcer’s revenue maximization problem:
cb · x − cw · x + A − 2ASb =0 .




2A . This, in turn, provides the steady state black
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Note that since the model is no longer dynamic, it is seen that this is a unique steady state. This is the
steady state which results simply from the collection of data. We have not yet considered the impact of
the actual ban of racial proﬁling. It is interesting to compare this steady state to that obtained in the
previous section because data collection is an essential part of ERPA, but it is also interesting because
some states are currently collecting this data, while others are not. Since the data collection itself is not
cost-less, it is of interest to determine whether it provides other beneﬁts than the enforcement of the
legislation.19 To examine the eﬀects of the ban on racial proﬁling, we need to determine how J∗
ERPA
changes when costs of deviating from random sampling increase. Finally, it is of interest to compare
the ERPA steady state to the fair steady state which the legislation is attempting to obtain.
18In reality they would have similar data from other oﬃcers working the same highway, and, thus, have access to even
more information.
19In a 2001 article in The Times-Picayune, Representative Cedric Richmond, D-New Orleans is quoted as saying that
such data collection would cost Louisianna about $1 million per year.
12Proposition 2 a) The ERPA steady state always has fewer blacks in jail than the limited information
steady state, but more than the fair steady state.
b) The level of the ERPA steady state can be decreased either by increasing the cost of non-random
stopping A, or by decreasing the level of x.
c) ERPA equals the fair steady state when there is no incentive scheme (x =0 ) or when costs of
non-random sampling are inﬁnity (A = ∞).
The implication of this theorem is that the excess jailing of blacks can be reduced by ensuring that
police oﬃcers have access to enough data to obtain accurate estimates of crime rates in the diﬀerent
populations. Thus, the data collection, which the legislation views solely as a means of enforcing the ban
on racial proﬁling, in itself decreases the burden on the population that is being investigated with higher
intensity. While the steady state becomes more fair with the additional information, even the ban on
racial proﬁling does not force the police to sample completely randomly unless any and all incentives to
catch guilty criminals can be eliminated, or alternatively the cost of non-random sampling is inﬁnity. We
believe that this policy point is important because implementing the ban on racial proﬁling is deemed
to be very costly. Our model shows that, even though a state is not willing or able to enforce the ban
on racial proﬁling, it is likely to derive beneﬁts from the data collection as long as this information is
dispersed among its police oﬃcers.
Comparing our results to those of other papers in the literature, for example Persico (2002), it is
worth noting that those other papers obtain the fair steady state even though they have no cost of
non-random sampling. This is driven by the fact that crime rates decline as a population is sampled.
In those models the crime rates are eventually equalized through this mechanism, random sampling
becomes optimal, and the fair steady state is achieved. It is conceivable that if a cost of non-random
sampling was to be introduced in these models, there might not be enough excess sampling of the high-
crime group to equalize crime rates across diﬀerent groups and it might be possible to obtain results
similar to those presented in this paper.
In short, we ﬁnd that when the crime rates cannot equalize, as clearly they have not yet done in
the US, it is not possible to obtain the fair steady state, as long as police oﬃcers are provided with
incentives to arrest criminals. Interestingly, the ERPA actually addresses the issue of incentives. Under
the header “FINDINGS”, the following statement is made: “Current local law enforcement practices,
such as ticket and arrest quotas, and similar management practices, may have the unintended eﬀect
of encouraging law enforcement agents to engage in racial proﬁling.” In section 201, under the header
13“POLICIES TO ELIMINATE RACIAL PROFILING,” the ERPA states that “IN GENERAL - Federal
law enforcement agencies shall cease existing practices that encourage racial proﬁling.” While the bill
does not go so far as to eliminate incentives, this is purely due to the fact that Congress does not ﬁnd
it to be well established that incentive pay leads directly to racial proﬁling.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we show that statistical discrimination is typically optimal in the context of highway
stops. This is in line with empirical ﬁndings in the literature. Speciﬁcally, Knowles, Todd, and Persico
(2001) develop a test to determine whether the decision by a policeman to stop a vehicle is triggered
by eﬃciency reasons or by racist motives. They apply the test to data gathered in a recent legal case
in which state troopers have been accused of racial discrimination. The authors are unable to show
that racial discrimination is motivated by reasons other than eﬃciency. This sample data exhibits
an overwhelming number of searches performed on African-American motorists, but the proportion of
motorists found guilty within the African-American and the white group are very close.20 This data
is also consistent with our results that even marginally higher crime rates in one group can lead to
a higher percentage of stops from this group, and, in turn, imply that the high crime group will be
over-represented in jails.
An important issue that we have refrained from discussing so far is the welfare implications of
the results. When considering societal welfare, there are three aspects that we consider important:
Eﬃciency, that is, getting as many criminals as possible oﬀ the streets at the lowest possible cost;
fairness; and the cost of data collection. Any welfare function would have to contain these three parts.
If a welfare function contained these three elements, it would be possible to make inferences about the
amount of data to collect and the level of incentives to provide to police oﬃcers. Unfortunately, it is
unclear how one would weigh issues of fairness against eﬃciency, or whether there is even a trade-oﬀ
between the two (see Persico (2002)). As such, we leave these issues for future research.
20They ﬁnd that among a total of 1530 searches, 63.4% were performed on African-Americans, whereas only 29.3% were
performed on white motorists. However, within the set of people arrested, 34% of the blacks were found guilty of drug
possession, as were 32% of the whites.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Let Q =
qx










w. Then we can write equations (2) as
zt+1 =
1
2cb + cbQ[zt − yt]
q +( cb − cw)Q[zt − yt]
yt+1 =
1
2cw − cwQ[zt − yt]
q +( cb − cw)Q[zt − yt]




2cb + cbQ[2zt − 1]
q +( cb − cw)Q[2zt − 1]
(A1)









(cb + cw) − Qcw ±
r
(cb + cw)
2 Q2 +( cb − cw)






Now, clearly two steady states exist as long as the term under the square root is positive. It is easy to
verify that this is always the case. Note that the condition states that a second degree polynomial in Q
must be positive:
(cb + cw)
2 Q2 +( cb − cw)




2 > 0 (A2)
















Clearly these are both complex, and, therefore, the inequality in (A2) is always satisﬁed. As a result,
there are always two steady states.
16A.1 Proof of a)
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Clearly, by this deﬁnition, J∗
L <J ∗
H when cb >c w. It then remains to be proven that J∗
H is stable. To
simplify notation, we will deﬁne the function f : R → R by
f (z)=
1
2cb + cbQ(2z − 1)
q +( cb − cw)Q(2z − 1)
,
such that zt+1 = f (zt). Stability is then implied for a steady state J∗ if f0 (J∗) < 1. Therefore, it is nec-















it is easy to see that f00 (z) < 0 for z>z a and f00 > 0 for z<z a.
To show that the steady state J∗
H is stable, we need to show that f0 (J∗
H) < 1. To prove this, we will
show that J∗
L lies to the right of the asymptote. Since J∗
H >J ∗
l , this would also imply that J∗
H lies to




17Clearly, if this is the correct depiction, it must be the case that f0 (J∗
H) < 1, since f cuts the 45-degree
line from above at J∗
H. For J∗











2 Q2 +( cb − cw)




















(cb + cw) >
r
(cb + cw)
2 Q2 +( cb − cw)





Since both sides of this equation are positive, we can square both sides and rearrange to get the following
very simple expression:
0 > −4cbcwQ
Clearly, this always holds, and we have established that J∗
H is a stable steady state.
A.2 Proof of b)














b − 12cbcwQ +2 Qc2
w + c2
b +2 cbcw + c2
w
Q2 (cb − cw)
q
(cb + cw)
2 Q2 +( cb − cw)
2 Q − 4cbcwQ + 1
4 (cb + cw)
2
Simple algebra veriﬁes that this expression is positive if
(cb + cw)
r³
4Q2 (cb + cw)
2 +4 Qc2
b − 24cbcwQ +4 Qc2




b − 12cbcwQ +2 Qc2
w +( cb + cw)
2
T h ee x p r e s s i o nt ot h el e f to ft h ei n e q u a l i t yi sd e ﬁnitely positive, but the expression on the right might
be negative. If it is negative, the inequality clearly holds, and if it is positive, we can square both sides
while maintaining the direction of the inequality. Squaring both sides and simplifying the expression,
we are left with
c2
w + c2
b − 2cbcw =( cb − cw)
2 > 0,







H/∂Q · ∂Q/∂A<0, and the proof is complete.
18A.3 Proof of c) and d)
Here we need to investigate when J∗
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Now, since Q =0is equivalent to x =0or A = ∞, we have shown that the fair steady state is
implemented for this value. Furthermore, since ∂J∗
H/∂Q>0, the jail rate for blacks will be higher than
the fair steady state for all other values of Q. This completes the proof of c) and d).
B Proof of Proposition 2





w >F∗. By (3)and the deﬁnition of F∗,t h i sc a nb ew r i t t e na s
cb + cb (cb − cw) x
A







19This expression easily simpliﬁes to
2cw > 0,
which holds since we have assumed that 1 >c i > 0,i = w,b.
Now, from (A1), we know that
z∗ =
1
2cb + cbQ[2z∗ − 1]
q +( cb − cw)Q[2z∗ − 1]
. (A3)






w. By (A3)and (3)this can be written as
1
2cb + cbQ[2z∗ − 1]
q +( cb − cw)Q[2z∗ − 1]
>
cb + cb (cb − cw) x
A




Re-arranging provides the expression
(cb + cw)[2z∗ − 1] > (cb − cw),





But this condition is exactly the condition that z∗ >F ∗, w h i c hw eh a v ej u s tv e r i ﬁed, and the proof of
part a) is, therefore, complete.
To prove part b) we need to show that ∂J∗
ERPA/∂A<0 and that limx→0J∗
ERPA = F∗. Simple
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ERPA =l i m
x→0
cb + cb (cb − cw) x
A










ERPA =l i m
x→0
cb + cb (cb − cw) x
A







which completes the proof.
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